Project Report on

Strengthening Community Resilience against Radicalization & Violent Extremism

Sub Theme: A Comparative Assessment of Disengagement and Rehabilitation programs for Returnees in Kenya

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Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
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becomes a failed state (the Conversation.com 2015); ‘Arms Proliferation, Disarmament and Human Security in the Horn of Africa’ (J-STEM Vol.6. No.1 and 2; 2014); Why We Need a Politician Champion in the Management of State Affairs (the People Daily 2013); ‘The challenge of reconciliation in post-conflict Sudan’. (J-STEM Vol.3 No.1&2, 2012); Book review; Peace and Conflict Studies in a global context by P.G Okoth, (J-STEM Vol.3 No.1&2, 2012).

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1.0 Introduction

Radicalization of the youth into terrorism has become an existential threat to modern societies, governments, religious organisations, the private sector as well as international organizations. Specifically Radicalization becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives.\(^1\) Radicalization which in turn leads to violent extremism has caused governments to lose power, distorted fundamental religious principles thereby relegating religious truths to the periphery in the minds of the radicalized youth, created inter religious conflicts, destroyed many countries’ economies and created massive humanitarian crises causing untold sufferings to millions of people. It is therefore necessary to find ways of dealing with the problem. Governments, Civil society and other key stakeholders have devised a number of soft approaches to contain radicalization which is likely to result into violent extremism. Among these include, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorist returnees with a view to make radicalization a less preferred choice by supposedly aggrieved members of a community.

The thrust of most terrorist reduction strategies is based on a perception that sees a radicalized person as a victim who happens to be in unwanted trap and as such deserved rescue by benevolent actors. In accordance with this perception, governments and other stakeholders are obliged to create a very conducive environment which not only pleases the rescued victim but also compensates such a person of whatever deprivation he/she might have suffered before joining a radical group. Such an ideal environment is not possible in real life situation and any attempt to manage radicalization under the banner of grievances caused by deprivation is likely to fail and the frustrated deradicalized individuals are likely

to go back to extremist behaviour. In fact a big number of individual radicalize themselves through social media and other channels meaning this is their preferred choice of life!

Given the controversy surrounding terrorist reduction strategies it is therefore imperative that a knowledge based approach in the conceptualization, design and implementation of counter terrorism strategies be pursued in order to be more effective in the fight against radicalization and hence terrorism.

In this regard the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) of the University of Nairobi and African Policy Institute (API) in collaboration with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have undertaken an empirical study with a view to develop a knowledge based approach in designing various measures, interventions and strategic plans to deal with the radicalization menace.

1.2 Research Objectives

1. To analyse de-radicalization and disengagement programmes in Kenya

2. To evaluate the rehabilitation, reintegration, and terrorist risk reduction programmes in Kenya

3. To assess the early release programmes and rate of terrorist recidivism in Kenya

4. To identify other systematic initiatives aimed at integrating terrorist returnees to the mainstream population

5. Identify key lessons across programmes and standards associated with verifiable outcomes and success measures.

6. Based on the findings, conceptualize appropriate interventions to change the behavior of terrorist offenders.
1.3 Study Methodology

This research was conducted in the Northern Kenya border region (Garissa, Mandera and Wajir); the coastline border region of Kenya (Kilifi, Kwale, Tana River, Lamu and Mombasa) and parts of Nairobi. A two pronged approach was followed in gathering primary data to inform on the strides made in strengthening community resilience against radicalization and extreme violence. The data was then collected using structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews with full disclosure as to the nature, rationale and purpose of the exercise. Both the questionnaires and the in-depth interviews have been analysed and the results presented in this report.

Purposive sampling technique was employed targeting key informants who deal with security matters, the business community, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations to help identify gaps that can in the assessment of the disengagement and rehabilitation of terrorist returnees in Kenya. Top line findings from the interviews are summarized in this report. To complement the filed data the participating institutions organized a dialogue workshop for stakeholders and key policy makers.

The purpose of the dialogue forum was to provide an opportunity to key policy makers and other stakeholders to contribute to the agenda by discussing the theme of the study namely: a comparative assessment of disengagement and rehabilitation programs for returnees.

2.0 Literature Review

An important part of this study involved a critical review of academic and policy works on the subject matter. Given the grave security threat posed by radicalization, both scholars and policy makers have documented in-depth analysis of the key concepts related to radicalization and de-radicalization as well as best practices applied by different countries and communities to address this menace. This section unpacks some of the key comparative literature related to theme of this study.

2.1 Conceptualizing Radicalization and De-radicalization.

Radicalisation to any form of terrorist violence is a phased process that involves one’s transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes. On the other hand violent radicalisation is the active pursuit

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of violence to attain the stated goal. On the same breadth violent extremism is a process by which individuals are introduced to an explicitly ideological rhetoric and belief system that encourages movement from modest, conventional beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives

John Horgan (2008) identifies three phases for an individual terrorist: ‘becoming' a terrorist, 'being' a terrorist and 'disengaging' from terrorism. Disengagement from terrorist activities includes physical and psychological aspects. Psychological aspects may entail a change of priorities in the individual’s mind towards the group, including developing negative sentiments or disillusionment with the political aims and actions of the organization. Physical disengagement entails a move away from opportunities to engage in violent behaviour. Arrest, imprisonment and death are typical kinds of disengagement.

In his book, *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, Tore Bjorgo argues that there are both pull and push factors which determine a terrorist’s decision to leave the group. The “push” factors are the negative circumstances prompting his/her exit. These could include a lack of commitment towards the organization, individual loss of enticement with the ideological motivations, or parental or social disapproval. Conversely, the pull factors are opportunities carrying a more promising potential, such as a job, a desire to continue with one’s education or found a family.

Several factors are in support of the disengagement process, including a public rupture from the organization even when the ideology remains strong. Individuals may leave a group for fear of lacking social ties outside of the group. Similarly, the individual may also leave for fear of retaliation and lack of protection. Lastly, given that many join terrorist groups for opportunistic or economic reasons, lack of employment opportunities can motivate them to leave. Rational consideration of the psychological rewards that accrue with one’s change from radicalized belief systems to de-radicalized belief system can also motivate one to de-radicalize. For

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3 ibid
4 Leila Ezzarqui, 2010 MA dissertation Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
5 Leila Ezzarqui, 2010 MA dissertation Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
6 Ibid
7 ibid
instance the prospect of being released from prison and leading a normal life is a compelling reward that can motivate individuals to embrace the de-radicalization.

De-radicalization programs seek to address the ideological challenge and thwart the appeal of militancy; transforming attitudes and seeking to rehabilitate individuals into mainstream society. These programs essentially target the individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. According to Renee Garfinkel, the decision to de-radicalize was often an individual decision and reference to role models was often cited as an important factor in distancing from radical beliefs. He argues that trauma was an important factor that precipitates one’s decision to de-radicalize, essentially implying that the key foundation of re-education and rehabilitation programs should be ideological- encompassing the reinterpretation of theological arguments to “delegitimize the use of violence against the state, the society, and the “other”.

Most state-run programs encourage both de-radicalization and disengagement in efforts to build community resilience against terrorism. Disengagement, which is behavioural, requires the abandonment of violence while de-radicalization seeks to de-legitimize the ideological reasons which permit society’s norms to be violated. In disengagement, the individual has left the group, but has not necessarily de-radicalized. John Horgan, concurs with this argument and describes disengagement as “a process in which the individual’s role within an organization changes from violent participation to a less active role”. In addition, by understanding the key factors of successful practices in disengagement, a better understanding of the crucial elements needed to devise a more suitable de-radicalization program can be contemplated.

Disengagement and de-radicalization programs are important components of soft power approaches and are regarded as significant contributors to traditional counterterrorism methods. Based on their work on terrorism and violent extremism, Bjørgo and Horgan developed a set of theoretical models and concepts on exit processes and disengagement from armed groups. According to the scholars, ‘Disengagement’ refers to changes in behavior and

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8 Leila Ezzarqui, 2010 MA dissertation Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
9 Leila Ezzarqui, 2010 MA dissertation Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
11 ibid
participation in social groups and activities. ‘De-radicalisation’ on the other hand, refers to changes in values and attitudes. Theories on disengagement processes are built around push and pull factors. Push factors are negative forces and circumstances that make certain social affiliations unattractive and unpleasant. Conversely, pull factors offer attractive and rewarding alternatives to a life of crime.\textsuperscript{14}

The struggle against terrorism, however, is never-ending. As Rachelle Omamo\textsuperscript{15} points out, terrorism is more of a moving target, making it difficult for hard power to map with precision. Terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures while continuing to identify and exploit its opponent’s vulnerabilities. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent.\textsuperscript{16} The development of counter-terrorism policies reflects domestic political processes and different national approaches, and could be explained by different self-conceptions and institutional practices. Thus a counter-terrorism strategy constitutes “those state actions that aim to suppress terrorist violence, utilizing any or all tools of statecraft including the use of military force, criminal law measures, intelligence operations, regulatory controls, and diplomacy”\textsuperscript{17}.

Building a resilient society in which individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those who espouse them, is critical in fighting extremism and terrorism. A resilient community is one that can detect, discourage and literally reject attempts convert its members into violent extremism. Resilient communities have strong psychosocial institutions which build on the ideals of humanity and sanctity of human life to oppose perverted ideologies which depart from the basic tenets of diversity and human co-existence. There is an urgent need to develop an effective, long-term counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies that will reduce the appeal of radicalism while persuading people who are already in radical organisations to leave them. In recent years, governments have

\textsuperscript{14}Bjørgo2009
\textsuperscript{15}Kenya cabinet Secretary for defence, 2016
\textsuperscript{16}The Organization of African Unity (OAU) counter-terrorism convention of 1999 was adopted in reaction to the 1998 al Qaeda strikes in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; the African Union counterterrorism plan of action of 2002; and the AU protocol to the convention of 2004.
begun incorporating soft power approaches not as a substitute, but as a complementary strategy to be applied alongside hard power approaches.  

2.2 Disengagement

Individual disengagement from terrorism may be, broadly speaking, the result of an individual or collective process or a combination of both. We can identify both psychological and physical dimensions of disengagement.

There are revealing case studies of States aiming for a new *modus vivendi* with terrorist groups, especially in Europe and South America. Increasingly, individuals and groups are exiting terrorism, renouncing violence for peaceful dialogues and integrating into society. Unlike ‘hard’ measures, ‘soft’ ones can succeed in palliating the hearts and minds of even hard-core terrorists, especially when they are disillusioned, longing for a normal life, and want to exit from terrorism. The opportunity to exit from a covert life; the attraction of amnesty or reduced sentence for crimes; availability of education, job training and economic support; development of new social networks; longing for an ordinary and peaceful life; or the desire to start a family, can lead an individual to abandon terrorism.

State-run programs encourage two types of important, yet different psychological and social processes: de-radicalization and disengagement. While de-radicalization is ideological, disengagement is behavioural. Disengagement requires the abandonment of violence. De-radicalization seeks to de-legitimize the ideological reasons which permit society’s norms to be violated. In other words, de-radicalization results from a change in beliefs or ideology, whereas disengagement refers to changes in actions with an end of violence. More specifically, in disengagement, the individual has left the group, but has not necessarily altered or denounced his ideology.

As a result, disengagement is not sufficient to guarantee de-radicalization, but it often can precede de-radicalization. While de-radicalization programs are a relatively new concept, disengagement is not. John Horgan describes disengagement as a process in which the

http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/bastug-2016-individual-disengagement/
individual’s role within an organization changes from violent participation to a less active role noting that disengagement alone does not necessarily beget de-radicalization, nor is de-radicalization a “necessary accompaniment to disengagement.”

Several strategies have been adopted to promote Disengagement, De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation (DDR) of terrorists. Clear example of a successful DDR strategy is one that has been adopted by a number of ASEAN states that are facing the threat from Jemaah Islamiyyah. Singapore has had a successful religious rehabilitation programme, run by the Religious Rehabilitation Group, aimed at correcting the deviationist ideological outlook of its arrested terrorists. Indonesia, facing the most serious threat from Jemaah Islamiyyah, has complemented its hard line approach with a nascent DDR programme, including using repentant terrorists to win over dedicated members of Jemaah Islamiyyah.

2.3 Rehabilitation and Reintegration

In recent years, a growing number of states have come to accept the view, implicitly or otherwise, that their respective national security interests may be served by exploring how to facilitate and manage the reintegration of convicted terrorists back into society. While not every returning foreign fighter or terrorist dropout can be reintegrated into society, some can. Even among those who can be prosecuted and convicted, the vast majority will eventually be released.

Foreign fighter returnees are a major security concern precisely because of their battlefield experience, training in the use of weapons and connections to international terrorist networks. In the fight against terrorism, rehabilitation or de-radicalisation can be seen as an innovative approach that goes beyond strategies that rely on harsh oppression and detention of terrorists. Efforts to rehabilitate/de-radicalise terrorists in prisons have provided a platform for convicted terrorists to express remorse, repent, or recant their violent ideology. Within a broader trend of

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19 John Hogan ob cit
security-focused hard measures, some governments have adopted liberal approaches to dealing with returning foreign fighters. While returnees should still face justice for having joined, trained with, fought for, or supported a proscribed terrorist organization, “a citizen of a modern democratic state governed by law … should be given the opportunity of rehabilitation and inclusion into society,”\(^{22}\) Once fighters return, whatever threat they might pose should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. While very few are likely to commit a terrorist attack, many may be disillusioned and affected by post-traumatic stress disorder.

The receiving community also needs to be involved, and empowered on how best to reintegrate the returnees back home. The Rome Memorandum lays out twenty-five best practices, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution.\(^{23}\) One key lesson is that rehabilitation and reintegration programs must have some type of connectivity to law enforcement and intelligence gathering, to decrease the risk of trying to reintegrate compromising individuals who are intent on doing harm.\(^{24}\)

In Denmark, a specific reintegration project was launched which focused on offenders on probation or parole who were (suspected to be) involved in ‘jihadist’ terrorism or extremism. The main objective of the approach is to reduce the chance of recidivism among extremist and terrorist offenders through re-socialization and aftercare measures. Assisting the programme’s so-called clients in finding a job, schooling, housing and debt relief and addressing psychological problems or reconciliation with family members are important components of this approach.\(^{25}\)

2.4 Result-based Approaches to disengagement

Practical experience on the ground shows there is no one-size-fits-all strategy and no guarantees that DDR would terminate terrorism due to the danger of recidivism. Thus the


Realist framework that advocates for results based approaches,\textsuperscript{26} is rooted in the appreciation that in policy, no single approach is adequate and that similar policies can produce very different outcomes when implemented in different settings. To explain why policies work or fail in a particular context, the Realist approach examines the underlying mechanisms through which policy instruments generate certain outcomes under certain conditions. From a Realist perspective, the question is not ‘what works’, but ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’.

Interventions are therefore dynamic and largely depend on the context in which they are implemented and evolve over time as the context and stakeholder perspectives change. Ipso facto, although programmes cannot be replicated across contexts, general understandings of what works for whom, when, and why are transferable. This makes the Realist approach particularly valuable for such complex interventions as rehabilitation programmes for violent extremists, which are made up of several interrelated components (e.g. training programmes, economic support, aftercare) and implemented in a broad range of contexts (e.g. different countries, with different criminal justice systems and prison settings) and for different types of extremist offenders (e.g. Islamists, nationalists, guerrillas, right wing extremists).\textsuperscript{27}

The Realist framework recommends a theory driven yet evidence based approach for identifying and designing the programmes that are capable of achieving the desired end results.\textsuperscript{28} Evidence based policies are defined as policies that can be justified in terms of the best available data about the interventions and their likely effects. They are rooted in a strong, evidence based theory about how and why the programme is expected to produce specific outcomes. Fusing both realist and evidence based approaches in programme design creates a solid foundation for counterterrorism intervention. This helps in developing suitable programme design systems, evaluation mechanisms, research design and implementation and outcome of the programme.


\textsuperscript{27}ibid

2.5 Community-based DDR

There is a strong argument for strengthening community infrastructure as a counter terrorism measure. Such measure helps build more community resilience and better systems to deal with internal problems. It is also much easier to engage with the government and others outside their community because they have a ready-made network through which to work. Thus community engagement is the cornerstone of effective counter-terrorism policy, influencing both the formation and implementation of strategies. There is need to put communities at the heart of approaches to counter-terrorism because first, communities offer important sources of information and intelligence; they are our own in-built early warning system. The community is also the most effective level at which to effect lasting change.

In its self-policing role, communities picking up early warning signs are best placed to act preemptively to divert their young people from extremism. While the state must also play a role, communities must take the lead in tackling problems that either create grievances or hinder their ability to prosper, such as poverty, poor educational and employment attainment, and the paucity of effective leadership and representation.

In the UK, in the aftermath of the July 2005 bombing, the government launched the ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ (PET) initiative in an attempt to work with Muslim communities to fight the threat from home-grown terrorism. The programme was initiated in towns and cities in the UK where government held consultations with over a thousand British Muslims to discuss ways in which the government could work with communities to prevent extremism.

Community-based counter-radicalization programs in the Netherlands include an initiative that mobilizes social services (i.e. housing, schooling, welfare benefits etc.) as a means of prevention for those identified by the police as dangerously close to committing themselves to violence on behalf of the militant jihad. The UK also built a program modelled after the Dutch and developed community-based programs for dialogue and outreach to prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies while addressing extremists themselves.

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30 ibid
Despite this strong support for a community-based approach to disengagement, a plethora of impediments limit the utility of such measures. First, a number of disengaged returnees are not honest; and are likely to use this opportunity to infiltrate the community with a view to recruit more people for the radical movements. They are also likely to gather intelligence of who are opposed to their movement. Another dilemma associated with the community approach is the backlash from local people that comes after rewarding the returnees when those who remained at home have nothing. Most of the amnesty programs propose a reward as an effective measure to motivate active terrorists to disengage. This could be in form of jobs, a new wife, joining a college or even cash reward. Conversely returnees are likely to be turned into terrorism targets for betraying the movement. The question is to what extent can you expose repentant terrorists without threatening their lives?

Any community based approach must also consider the gender perspectives of the returnees. Increasingly, most terrorist groups such as Boko Haram are using women either as perpetrators of violence or comfort givers to the actual terrorists. When such women are disengaged, they find it difficult to reintegrate into the community due to lack of enabling structures. These challenges notwithstanding, the government and civil society should endeavour to work together to build a more varied and resilient infrastructure, reinforcing the existing bonds within the community and building new ones between the community and other actors in the disengagement value chain.

### 2.6 Reformation through Prison Programmes

The growing emphasis on prison-based rehabilitation programs in governments’ efforts to counter violent extremism results from three factors. First, prisons may become ‘safe havens’ for terrorists carrying on their operations, including radicalizing new members. Second, some imprisoned extremists will eventually be released and thus must be disengaged. Third, prison settings can be a setting where positive change can occur, as violent extremists are cut off from their old networks and influences.³¹

Prison authorities in many countries are grappling with how to best address militant jihadi prisoners and those vulnerable to their aggressive recruitment. Saudi Arabia, Singapore,

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Malaysia, Jordan, the United States, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, Netherlands, the UK and many other countries have all begun to address the need for prison rehabilitation and prevention programs to address and mitigate the spread of militant jihadi activities within prisons.

The spectrum of extremism in prisons ranges from those who entered prisons as devoted extremists, having been convicted for some terrorist related act, to those who merely supported such groups for opportunist reasons, fondly referred to as sympathizers. If left under the influence of extremist leaders inside the prison, they have a strong chance of becoming indoctrinated by militant jihadists and leaving prison as future radicals.

The rehabilitation needs for these two groups are variant. Those who are ideologically indoctrinated need to have their worldview addressed, whereas those for whom trauma was a primary catalyst for engaging in terrorism require posttraumatic stress therapy, while those already converted are unlikely to disengage from terrorism and might even be drawn further into the extremism by a program that addresses only ideology. Such individuals may need vocational skills training and psychological assistance to reorient to a different, non-violent means of expression or income earning.

A well-known and long-standing reform programme through prison system is one developed by Saudi Arabia. The programme was developed for returnee “jihadists” who received military training in Afghanistan and returned with a purpose to overthrow the kingdom. To counter this, a group of respected Islamic scholars visited the jihadists individually in prison to engage in discussions over their beliefs and would challenge them with authentic teachings of Islam. The clerics were often able to win them over and move them to a more moderate stance that no longer endorsed terrorism. In a spin-off effect, the clerics were able to gain important intelligence from the prisoners that led to further arrest of more operatives

The Saudi Arabia government dangled incentives to the prisoners for positive participation in the reforms process. These included offering of material incentives and other financial provisions upon release, targeting their genuine concern for joining extremism. This way, the

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authorities were able to keep close watch on released prisoners, monitoring their every move to ensure they did not resume extremist memberships or activities. An important lesson emerging from the Saudi programmes, is ideological realignment alone was not sufficient and called for psychiatric and psychological professionals to assist assess the prisoners needs throughout the program.33

In Algeria, the prison rehabilitation program seeks to stop the spread of extreme ideology by separating those perceived indoctrinators from other inmates. Mostly, in these programs the state targets the leaders of radical movements to reconcile and reintegrate and in turn, they ask their followers to lay down arms34. Similarly, in Egypt the prison de-radicalization programs involved both giving rights and offering rewards. The rights included halting executions and torture, solitary confinements as well as state brutality in the community35. The rewards centred on prisoner release, improved prison visits, and an imprisonment close to the detainees’ home village or town.36 There was also an education component in which the state encouraged prisoners to study, allowed them to access newspapers as well as watch television. They were also allowed to interact with group leaders as well as non-group members. In these programs the state outreach work within prisons involved radical group leaders who publicised their ideological revision through prison tours and interviews through both television and radio37.

In Singapore, the rehabilitation system involves incentives to the extremist prisoner and his family while still in prison; and providing employment for prisoners upon release. As a follow-up mechanism after release from prison, the authorities strongly encouraged continued meeting with the prison clerics weekly for a year to ensure no relapse.38 The Malay treatment programme is almost similar to the Singaporean system but employed forms of coercion to comply. The programme ran for 2-3 year-long and was based upon group lectures, individual counselling with multiple clerics, with forms of physical “disciplining” of prisoners who didn’t

35ibid
36ibid
37ibid
comply with State-sponsored Islamic teachings against militant jihad. In Indonesia the use of radicals to de-radicalise militants was championed, because they have credibility. The system also extended incentives to prisoners and their families. But as Bennett (2008)\textsuperscript{39} states, the programme has recorded minimal achievements since it has only been able to reach few of the hard core militants.

2.7 Disengagement and Reintegration of Returnees in Kenya

Kenya is an attractive location for radical and terrorist groups due to the ease of doing business as well as developed infrastructural facilities.\textsuperscript{40} This is because radical and terrorist groups need resources to thrive, i.e. economic stability, communication and transport infrastructure to access their networks or cells.

A study by Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM) and National Cohesion and Integration Commission conducted in the coastal region to get a better understanding of the motivational factors behind the radicalisation, found out that alienation and lack of opportunities resulting from discriminatory policies or politics have contributed immensely towards radicalisation and terror in the country. For example radicalisation of Muslim youths at the Coast stems from region’s desperate economic, social, and political conditions\textsuperscript{41}. The study advocated an amnesty regulation to deal with the return of the youth who joined the Al-Shabaab organisation.

As a country that is in the frontline of the war against terrorism, Kenya has good lessons to learn from the other countries. In Kenya, a significant number of radicalized youth who joined terror groups abroad are now streaming back as ‘returnees’ and have already shown interest in being reintegrated into society under the amnesty programme announced by the government of Kenya in early 2015. Thus given the significant number of returnees sneaking back into the country, the government needs to work with appropriate non-state actors to assist it deal with

\textsuperscript{39} Amman Conference (2010): countering violent terrorism: learning from de-radicalization programs in some Muslim majority states. International peace institute

\textsuperscript{40} Raymond Muhula, “Kenya and the Global War on Terrorism: Searching for a New Role in a New War,” in \textit{Africa and the War on Terrorism}, ed. John Davis (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 47.

\textsuperscript{41} UNDP Kenya (2015) Strengthen Community’s Capacity Against Radicalization And Violent Extremism In Kenya. Project
this challenge—lest the returnees metamorphose into another deadly threat to national security.\(^42\)

The amnesty programme includes counselling and rehabilitation, as well as protection to those who have surrendered. It was promoted as part of a “countering violent extremism” strategy, to win over former combatants, and help de-radicalise the communities in which they live. Under the amnesty programme, a vetting system for returnees has been established to ensure that former fighters do not disappear into new criminal or extremist networks again. The vetting system conducted by the State authorities seeks first to establish and understand the level of engagement and responsibility of these ex-fighters; and where they will be reintegrated back to the community after clearance from the vetting. Reintegration includes organising sporting events, vocational trainings to impart skills, providing opportunities for education.

Any success of a rehabilitation program rests on the assumption that one can make change based on cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioural characteristics of the inmate.\(^43\) For example the economic motivation dangled by al-Shabab to lure fighters to join, have left many deserting and undertaking the deadly return trips back into the country. In this regard, more attention and resources set aside for fighting terrorism and violent extremism could be directed towards preventing support for violence on the front-end and stemming recruitment into terrorist and violent extremist groups on the back-end.

To counter the “Push and Pull” factors attracting the youth to enlist for militant groups, the Government of Kenya has made deliberate effort to resolve youth problem with programs such as the Uwezo Fund, Women Enterprise Fund which offer youth to go through training for which they can access such funds.\(^44\) A profile of returnees, compiled by the International Organization for Migration and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, found out that the prospect of a $500 to $1,000 salary used to recruit fighters - whom 46 percent, were reported to be self-employed, but typically in low-paying work like farming and fishing- was a lie and not lucrative as promised.\(^45\)


\(^{44}\)Ibid.

To effectively counter violent extremism, all stakeholders need to be involved. A better understanding of most effective tools in countering extremist recruitment and radicalization is critical. The faith-based group and civil society groups in Kenya and international partners have worked alongside the Government of Kenya to design a strategy for countering violent extremism. These non-governmental institutions serve as credible voices and are often best placed to understand grievances, leverage networks, and deliver messages on behalf of communities.

The government through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which is the agency responsible for coordinating implementation of the strategy, is currently working with various partners in implementing parts of the strategy. The NCTC has collaborated with the European Union and the Government of Denmark in implementing training programmes for law enforcement officers and Prisons and Probation Services Officers, equipping them with proper intervention tools and techniques in deciphering and managing radicalization cases.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{2.8 Conclusion}

Soft counter terrorism programs seeks to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual’s return to moderate society and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts\textsuperscript{47}. At the end of disengagement and rehabilitation programs there should be a reduction of number of active terrorists in society, re-socialized ex-members and a growing dissent among terrorist groups. This in turn reduces the financial and social cost of imprisonment and heavy reliance on the hard power approaches to counter terrorism.

In executing these soft counter terrorism strategies, it is important to consider a number of factors. First we should pay attention to the context in which a program is undertaken because ‘one size does not fit all’. Secondly, there is a need to incorporate improved after care services and improved vetting of potential beneficiaries to the programs. These would in effect reduce the degree of recidivism of de-radicalized individuals. In order to address the concern of

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\textsuperscript{47}ibid
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measuring success, governments should devise tangible targets for specific programs. A minimalist approach would be useful where you look at the substantive reduction of active terrorist in a community but not zero recidivism which may be hard to achieve. This can be complemented by tailoring the approach adapted to a particular individual or group. Ordinarily, those with ‘blood in their hands’ must be treated differently from others.

In addition to the above, success of any de-radicalization programs is directly linked to the extent to which a community is willing to accept back reformed terrorists. While these reformed people are useful in the society for fostering narratives on de-radicalization, they can cause resentment among community members. This is mostly the case if de-radicalization programs involve enticing people to abandon their radical groups through incentives such as financial assistance or reduced prison sentences. This may generate a backlash due to lack of buy-in from the community who feel that the programs are rewarding criminals. Thus governments should use such incentives sparingly and only in the absence of feasible alternatives.

3.0. Analysis and Discussion of Key Findings

In analysing the key findings of this study, an attempt has been made to point out the significance of each factor analysed in the study. This is primed to buffer the legitimacy of the research findings and the credibility of the study recommendations.

3.1 Demographic Characteristics

3.1.1 Gender

![Figure 1. Gender representation](image)

The study had a fair distribution of both male and female gender. However, a majority of the interviewed respondents were males accounting for 78.3% of the respondents against 21.7%
females. A majority of the interviewed respondents were males accounting for 78.3% of the respondents against 21.7% females.

3.1.2 Age

![Bar Chart: Age Distribution](image)

**Figure 2.** Age distribution

Of the people interviewed, 68.7% of the respondents were aged below 40 years with a majority falling in the 21-30 age bands. This population group represents the most active members of the society and are well conversant with the challenges of radicalization as such they are in a better position to assess the existing deradicalition and rehabilitation programs in Kenya.

3.1.3 County

![Bar Chart: Counties Sampled](image)

**Figure 3.** Counties Sampled

Comparatively the study had a very balanced treatment of the nine covered. Although the majority of the sampled respondents hailed from Mombasa and Nairobi counties, all the
counties sampled are considered to be fairly homogenous in relation to their susceptibility to terror attacks. This makes the data analysed and presented a true reflection of the situation on the ground.

3.1.4 Education

![Education levels of respondents](image)

**Figure 4**: Education levels of respondents

Most of the targeted respondents exhibited a high educational attainment with over 50% having attained university education and above. Only 2.3% had not accessed any formal education. Data from a high literate group is more informative and provides detailed analysis of the subject matter.

3.1.5 Religion

![Religious affiliations](image)

**Figure 5**: Religious affiliations

The study captured a fair share of the dominant religious communities in Kenya. The sampled respondents are slightly dominated by the Muslim community, accounting for a 51.1%
compared to 48.4% for Christians and 0.4% for the Hindi. This insulates the study from biased portrayal of facts.

3.1.6 Marital Status

![Marital Status Chart]

**Figure 6: Marital status**

Over 70% of the sampled respondents were found to be married. Since radicalization is mostly concentrated among the youth who are either sons or daughters of certain parents, information from married people reflect the true feelings of the affected population.

3.2 Aware of any de-radicalization programs

![De-radicalization Programs Chart]

**Figure 7: De-radicalization programs**

A substantial number of respondents 48.9% were aware of the existence of De-radicalization programs in various parts of Kenya. However, the study found that most de-radicalization programs are prevalent in Coast and Nairobi County. Some of the terrorist reduction
programmes initiated for terrorist returnees in Kenya include counselling and psychological support as well as income generating activities by government. At times the government operate such facilities in partnership with NGOs. In effect these programs have reduced the number of attacks since the people are more aware of recruitment tactics.

3.3 Why are most terrorists unwilling to disengage from terrorism activities?

The study sought to find out why terrorists were unwilling to disengage from terrorist activities. Comparatively the possibility of being targeted by group members was cited as the most important impediment to terrorist disengagement at 37% preference, followed by fear of stigma from host communities at 24% preference, then poor rehabilitation infrastructure at 22% preference and lastly lack of disengagement incentives at 15% preference.

3.3.1 Fear of stigma from host communities

![Figure 1: Fear of stigma from host communities](image)

De-radicalization carries with it a sense of surrender of persons initially regarded as a hero. Such a perception has high chance of attracting stigma if one is de-radicalized. This study confirms this view since 78.4% of respondents agree that fear of stigma from host communities contribute greatly to the unwillingness of terrorists to disengage from terrorism activities. This shows the need for strengthening community infrastructure as a counter terrorism measure. Such measures will help to build more community resilience and better systems to deal with
internal problems. Community engagement is the cornerstone of effective counter-terrorism policy, influencing both the formation and implementation of strategies.\textsuperscript{48}

3.3.2 Possibility of targeting by group members

![Bar chart showing possibility of targeting by group members](image)

**Figure 2: Possibility of targeting by group members**

An overwhelming 94.1% of respondents agree that the possibility of targeting by group members lead the returnees to be unwilling to disengage from terrorism activities. Respondents reported cases of retaliatory attacks on repentant returnees by the Al-Shabaab members or sympathizers especially in Kwale County, following the Government Amnesty program of 2013. This indicates that although some rehabilitation programs involve the use of returnees as role models to prove the success of De-radicalization, such measures could be counterproductive in the long run as they not only endanger the lives of returnees but are also a deterrent tactic by terror groups.

3.3.3 Lack of incentives to disengage

![Bar chart showing lack of incentives to disengage](image)

The decision to give or not to give incentives to returnees has generated substantial debate in academic circles. The fear is that enticements provide a rationale for ordinary people to embrace radicalization with a view of benefiting from government rewards. Conversely, those radicalized find no reason to disengage if there is nothing on offer for their “sacrifice.” In this study 64.2% of respondents agree with the proposition that lack of incentives discourage returnees from disengaging from terrorism activities. Given that many join terrorist groups for opportunistic or economic reasons; lack of employment opportunities can motivate them to leave. Rational consideration of the psychological rewards that accrue with one’s change from radicalized belief systems to de-radicalized belief system can also motivate one to de-radicalize. For instance the prospect of an economic lifeline and leading a normal life is a compelling reward motivating individuals to embrace the de-radicalization.

3.3.4 Poor rehabilitation and reintegration infrastructure

Another impediment to terrorism reduction efforts in Kenya is the poor rehabilitation and reintegration infrastructure in the country. 71% of respondents agree that poor rehabilitation and reintegration infrastructure leads to returnees lapsing back to terrorism activities. Respondents indicated that structures for rehabilitating returnees should be conducive for facilitating behavioural change. Rehabilitation programmes away from the returnee’s local

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environment were preferred as a safe space for returnees who were committed to a new lease of life.

3.4 Extent to which De-radicalization and rehabilitation programs have been useful to the disengaged persons

![Figure 5: Value of De-radicalization and rehabilitation programs disengaged persons in Kenya](image)

A majority - 63.8% of the respondents do not see the usefulness of rehabilitation programs in Kenya in changing the returnee’s inclination to cause terror. Some of the reasons given are that the programs might be the government’s strategy of arresting the returnees. Some of the factors cited by respondents include; fear, economic benefits and the declared amnesty. A100% of respondents cited fear of the government and the group as key reasons for the ineffectiveness of the rehabilitation programs.

3.5 What is the likelihood of those who have left terrorism returning?
Figure 6: Likelihood of those who have left terrorism returning

A majority 70.3% of the respondents felt that returnees can go back to terrorism. Many respondents cited lack of structures as the key reason for the returnees going back to terrorism. Lack of incentives to disengage was also another reason why the returnees can relapse back into terrorism.

3.6 Do you think terrorists have been persuaded to abandon their radical behaviour and groups through rewards?

Figure 7: Terrorists persuaded to abandon their radical behaviour and groups through rewards

There was mixed feelings on whether rewards can make returnees abandon their radical behaviour with a slight majority of 58.2 disagreeing while the 41.8% agree. Some of the rewards extended to returnees by the government include; declaration of amnesty, trainings to get empowered, reintegration and economic benefits. The civil society incentives for returnees include lifeline economic activities such as assisting the returnees in starting small businesses.

3.7 Those terrorist who abandon terrorist activities are integrated
Figure 8: Integration of returnees
A majority of the respondents (64%) disagree with the proposition that the terrorists who abandon terrorist activities are integrated back into the society. Most respondents could not identify cases where the returnees have been successfully reintegrated back to the community.

3.8 Any programs put in place for assisting returnees settle in mainstream population

Figure 9: programs put in place for assisting returnees settle in mainstream population
An overwhelming 74.8% of the respondents are not aware of any programs put in place to assist the returnees settle in the mainstream population. The respondents who were aware of the existence of such programmes identified civil society and government initiatives especially in Counties in the coast region.

3.9 Do local communities accept female terrorists than male terrorist in the society?

Figure 10: Acceptance of female terrorists by local communities
A majority 76% of the respondents are indifferent to the proposition that female terrorists are more acceptable than their male counterparts. Some of the reasons cited by the respondents include; fear, cultural beliefs as well as male dominance in terror groups. Those who agreed
with the proposition averred that female terrorists are more likely to change once they have disengaged and gone through the de-radicalization process.

4.0 Existing rehabilitation programs are more favourable to male or female terrorist?

![Bar chart showing responses to rehabilitation programs]

**Figure 11:** Whether existing rehabilitation programs are more favourable to male or female terrorist

More respondents (24.8%) felt that existing rehabilitation programs are more favourable to male returnees compared to female returnees (3.6%). This was attributed to the opinion that male terrorists have dominated the terrorism scene than female terrorists. A majority of the respondents are indifferent to the issue while 26.2% of the respondents feel that rehabilitation programs are favourable to none.

4.1: Terrorist risk reduction programs have led to a decrease in terrorism incidents in Kenya

![Column chart showing decrease in terrorism]

**Figure 12:** Terrorist risk reduction programs have led to a decrease in terrorism incidents in Kenya
A majority of 55.8% agree that terrorist risk reduction strategies have led to a decrease in terrorism incidents in Kenya. Some of the terror reduction strategies adopted include; killing of terrorists, increased security surveillance, joint efforts between community and security agents and increased number of rehabilitation programs. Only 1.8 % of the respondents viewed killing of suspected terrorists as a terror reduction strategy. 10.2 % of the respondents view increased security as a terror reduction strategy. 6.7 % of the respondents view rehabilitation programs as an effective tool for reducing terrorism activities while 29.3% were in favour of a joint approach between the government and the community as a more effective terror reduction strategy.

4.2: Are you aware of any de-radicalization/radicalization programs?

![Figure 13: Awareness of de-radicalization/radicalization programs](image)

Most respondents indicated the presence of de-radicalization programs more prevalent in Coast and Nairobi counties. Prevalence of these programmes in the counties of Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties was attributed to increased cases of radicalization and recruitment to terror groups in the areas. Other motivating factors to radicalization and recruitment were attributed to marginalization.

4.3: Usefulness of rehabilitation programs to the disengaged
Figure 14: Usefulness of rehabilitation programs to the disengaged

Most respondents do not perceive the radicalization programs as useful or helpful towards disengagement.

4.4: People who left terrorist activities can easily return

Figure 15: People who left terrorism activities can easily return

There is general consensus by respondents across the sampled counties that returnees can go back to terrorism activities.

4.5: Terrorist have been persuaded to abandon radical behaviour
Figure 16: Terrorist have been persuaded to abandon radical behaviour

A majority of the respondents across the counties felt that the returnees are yet to be convinced to abandon their radical behaviour. Ideological convictions and lack of structures for de-radicalization are some of the reasons indicated for this situation.

4.6: Those terrorist who abandon terrorist activities are integrated

Figure 17: Those terrorist who abandon terrorist activities are integrated

Majority of the respondents feel that those who abandon their terrorist activities are not easily integrated into the society.

4.7: Any programs put in place for assisting returnees settle in mainstream population?
Figure 18: programs put in place for assisting returnees settle in mainstream population

In Coastal counties, there are more respondents who are aware of existing programs to help returnees settle into the mainstream population than in the other counties.

4.8: Do local communities accept female terrorists than male terrorist in the society?

Figure 19: Whether local communities accept female terrorists than male terrorist in the society

In Kilifi and Kwale counties the respondents see female returnees as more acceptable than their male counterparts.

4.9: Existing rehabilitation programs are more favourable to male or female terrorist
Figure 20: Existing rehabilitation programs are more favourable to male or female terrorist

More respondents view rehabilitation programs as being more favourable to male compared to their female counterparts.

5.0: Terrorist risk reduction programs have led to a decrease in terrorism incidents in Kenya

Figure 21: Terrorist risk reduction programs have led to a decrease in terrorism incidents in Kenya
6.0 Summary of Key Findings from on Disengagement and Rehabilitation programmes for returnees in Kenya

The survey in trying to identify some of the terrorism reduction programs for returnees, found out that generally, most respondents were not aware of the existence of any such programs. However, in Garissa, Mombasa and Isiolo Counties, a program known as CVE (Combating Violent Extremism) is being run by the African Council of Religious Leaders and the National Council of Churches of Kenya. The Prisons Department runs an internal program to rehabilitate incarcerated returnees while Amnesty International is also running its programs in the Coastal Counties of Kilifi, Mombasa and Lamu; counties which are more prone to terror attacks. Similarly, MUHURI (Muslims for Human Rights) runs a program of creating co-operation between the security agencies and the Muslim community.

The terrorism reduction strategies have been useful in Kenya as they have contributed to correcting the false beliefs taught by the Radical Islamic Terrorists; creating a sense of humanity among the returnees - helping them to be more integrated into the wider society. The interventions may also have contributed in reducing the levels of threat, reducing the source of information for terrorists and can also be a campaign tool for anti-radicalization. Terrorism reduction strategies further create harmony between the community and the government.

The respondents were asked to give the rate at which the returnees go back to terrorism after the first rehabilitation and possible reasons for such scenarios. A good number of respondents were not aware of any such cases particularly in the coastal counties. Some respondents found the topic of returnees too sensitive to be discussed openly. However, in Mandera, the respondents reported that they believed the rate of return was very high as the returnees only needed to cross over from the neighbouring Somalia. The respondents indicated that those who are motivated by religious convictions are very difficult to rehabilitate.

The findings also noted that returnees might also choose to revert to terrorism if they are stigmatised and not accepted back in the community. Other reasons cited for returnees getting back to terrorism is harassment from government security agencies as well as fear of retaliatory attacks from the terror gang in what is considered as betraying the group’s members. MUHURI reported that mutual suspicion amongst returnees and the government increase chances of the returnees going back to terrorism activities.
Some of the actions that the government has taken with a view of re-integrating terrorist returnees to the Kenyan population included integrating the returnees with other inmates and involving the Imams and Pastors to engage the returnees in a dialogue. The government also grant them amnesty upon denouncing terrorism.

Many respondents felt that the government lacks coordinated efforts geared towards addressing the issue of returnees. Weak and poorly coordinated returnees’ programmes was identified as a reason why rehabilitation and disengagement programmes may still be struggling in when it comes to implementation.

In responding to the question on lessons learnt from rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in Kenya, respondents noted that some of the government initiated programmes are not as effective as NGO backed initiatives. The government’s failure to recognize the effects of the civil society in combating the CVE menace is a big drawback to its counter terrorism strategies. The respondents noted that the government should involve key stakeholders like the civil society, in the design and implementation of CVE strategies. Information sharing is a critical prerequisite in the enterprise of de-radicalisation. While returnees face different threats from society, they also pose certain degree of threats to the community. It is thus recommended that that returnees need to be vetted and classified based on such threats.

It is still early to measure any verifiable outcomes and successes of rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives. However, there are changing perceptions toward the government by the community and people are sharing information more freely.

Police have set up mechanisms to educate the masses on dangers of sharing terrorism related materials and opened many reporting mechanisms to ease sharing of information linked to radicalization and violent extremism. The survey noted that fewer people are leaving for Somalia.

On responding to the question on the right interventions that can be used in changing the behaviour of terrorist offenders, the respondents noted that alternative conflict resolution can help change the terrorists’ behaviour and attitude while community and government cooperation is key in reaching out to returnees. The government should stop profiling specific communities in its counter terrorism measures. Use of spiritual leaders is an effective tool in bringing the human aspect out of the returnees. The government should address issues of real
or perceived marginalisation by providing equal opportunities and ensure no region is left behind in development as this will address the economic grievance narrative.

7.0 Conclusion

Given the current trends on the success rate of countering violent extremism in Kenya, the debate on measures to curb this menace needs to be sustained. It is also imperative that key players in designing disengagement and rehabilitation programs for returnees conduct more research at the local communities’ level to identify the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism.

In executing different countering violent extremism strategies, it will be important to pay attention to a number of factors. First, we should define the context in which this programmes will be implemented because ‘one size does not fit all’. Secondly, programmes targeted at de-radicalization and disengagement should be driven and locally owned by the local communities. This will encourage community participation and increase collaboration between the various key players such as the government and the civil society. This is in line with the United Nations plan of Action to prevent Violent Extremism that was passed on 24th December, 2015.50

A shift from hard approach to countering violent extremism; to a softer counter terrorism strategy needs to be adopted. Disengagement and de-radicalization are components of soft approaches to countering violent extremism.51 This is because soft strategies seek to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual’s return to moderate society and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts.52 This approach may further facilitate the rate at which repentant returnees are accepted back by the local community.

While these reformed people are useful in the society for fostering any doubts about de-radicalization, they can cause resentment among community members. This is mostly experienced where de-radicalization programmes involve enticing people to abandon their radical groups through incentives such as financial assistance or reduced prison sentences. This may generate a backlash due to lack of buy-in from the community who feel that the programs

are rewarding criminals. Thus governments and other key players should equally use such incentives with caution.

8.0 Recommendations

8.1 Increase collaboration among key players

The respondents in all the sampled counties felt that increased co-operation between the government and the communities affected by terrorism activities will go a long way in helping prevent radicalization and hence prevent terrorism. The government, civil society, religious leaders, community based organizations and the private sectors should therefore institute measures geared towards encouraging citizen participation in combating violent extremism.

The amnesty programme that was extended by the government to the foreign terrorist fighters turned out to be problematic since the government and other implementation agencies could not identify genuine returnees and those who were undercover agencies for terrorist groups. The community stands a better chance in identifying genuine returnees thus working closely with members of their communities would be key in vetting these returnees. Blanket judgement and profiling of certain religious groups or communities has contributed to unsuccessful implementation of CVE initiatives. It is therefore recommended that the government stops profiling Muslim communities as a counter violent extremism strategy as this profiling constraints the chances of the Muslim community from collaborating with the government in CVE efforts.

8.2 Use preventive measures to radicalization and violent extremism

The main focus of counter-radicalisation efforts should not be the terrorists themselves but rather the strengthening and empowering of the communities from which they might emerge and which might, if neglected, be deemed potentially supportive of terrorists. CVE programmes should be aimed at preventing radicalization at every stage. To achieve this goal of preventing the emergence of terrorism, capacity-building to make a targeted community more resilient is often recommended. Proponents of counter-radicalisation programmes in relation to violent extremis propose initiatives such as: expand focus from violent to non-violent extremism; address local grievances; capitalize on relationships and friendships and challenge ideologies of terrorists’ propaganda. De-radicalization and disengagement programmes for returnees should be complemented by preventive measures way before these individuals are radicalized.
8.3 Community driven programmes

The government should let the civil society and religious leaders to lead the implementation of CVE programmes on recruitment, disengagement and rehabilitation of returnees. Religious and community leaders are at the core of challenging propagandist ideological narratives that can lead to radicalization or de-radicalization. The government and other players should support funding to locally grown and driven CVE programmes.

Efforts to recreate the image of the security agencies as a stakeholder interested in finding solutions to the problems facing the local persons should be intensified. This will build trust between the government security agencies and the local communities. This favourable working relationship will enhance information sharing with security agencies that could help in identifying potential terrorism activity and hence beneficial to the all parties. Local communities are in a better place to identify and know radicalized persons than outsiders. Community policing through avenues such as the Nyumba Kumi initiative should be pursued alongside this measure.

8.4 Communal parenting approach

Emerging cases of young children being radicalized and recruited into terror gangs such as Al-Shabaab need to be prevented and deterred as early as possible. In today’s society where parents spend less time with their children, the minors are left vulnerable as most of the time they are glued to the television and other forms of social media. Technology space provides the new opportunities for radicalization where a person can radicalize themselves right in the comfort of their room. Parents and guardians therefore need to be more vigilant in what their children are consuming from the mass media. In achieving this, the community should pursue an inclusive way of raising their children as it were in traditional African societies. This will help detect early warning signs of exposure to radical Islamic ideologies. Communal parenting of children should also be encouraged as a preventive measure to radical ideologies among children. Parents and guardians should encourage the young people to pursue their talents as this will also provide a diversion from activities that encourage radicalization.

8.5 Use of religion to counter ideological messages
It is imperative to counter the ideological narrative of the radicalized persons with an alternative ideology. The religious leaders should intensify sensitisation programs on the true beliefs of Islam with a view to countering the ideological propaganda of the terrorists. It is the responsibility of religious leaders and Committees in the Mosque to ensure that the kind of learning and teaching that takes place in the Mosques and Madrasas does not encourage radicalization. Some of the Madrassa curriculum needs to be analysed and reviewed for clearer understanding. Other religious efforts such as use of texts from the Koran on teachings such as on the ten role models who were promised paradise and what they did or they didn’t do should be integrated into the syllabus. Religious leaders should also be involved in visiting the radicalized persons in prisons for psycho-social support and counselling as part of de-radicalization process. Rehabilitating offenders is a complex exercise that requires concerted efforts from all stakeholders.

8.6 *Socio-economic empowerment programmes*

The government and other stakeholders need to address the socio-economic grievance factors by empowering the communities through livelihood programmes. There remains need for research in the affected areas to identify the economic reasons that encourages radicalization and the findings should inform the design of disengagement programmes. For instance, if young people are radicalized on the promise of employment by the Al-Shabaab, the government and other agencies should make effort to provide these economic lifelines to the young people. This will address the economic grievances issue which was identified as a push factor to radicalization. The government and other stakeholders should seek to build community resilience both at the community and personal levels. Empowerment programmes should be extended not only to the returnees but to other disenfranchised members in the community. Successful cases of reintegrated returnees should be referred to as role models to the rest of the community; with constant and clear follow up mechanisms to minimise cases or relapse for returnees.

8.7 *Benchmark the experiences of countries in other regions*

It is imperative to share global experiences on countering violent extremism from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Colombia, Denmark, and Indonesia among other states which have grappled with violent extremist groups. This can provide insights and good practice that can be customized for local contexts.
Kenya can learn from disengagement and rehabilitation programmes for returnees in other regions on how they utilized different interventions such as psychological counselling, religious re-education, vocational training, sports and arts therapy. Some programmes like those in Algeria address the post-release phase often involving intense surveillance of the former radicals and holding family members responsible for the post-release activities of the former terrorist.

8.8 Enhance Global cooperation and networking

Violent extremism and terrorism remain global challenges and there are many international actors who have been at the forefront in conducting research on counter terrorism and countering violent extremisms. Remarkable progress has been made on research on de-radicalization, re-integrating and rehabilitation programme for returnees and especially in the effort of evaluating the impact of these programmes. It is therefore important to forge global collaboration and networks in order to benefit from the experience of the countries which are ahead of Kenya in this field. Since universities are better placed to undertake collaborative research, the establishment of the Center for Counter terrorism Studies and Research at the University of Nairobi should be finalised. This center could lead in collaborative research and build regional and international partnerships with governments and other players in efforts to counter violent extremism.

8.9 Resource mobilization

Countering and preventing violent extremisms is a complex exercise that requires funding and a lot of supports in carrying out the various operations. More funds need to be allocated towards conducting research; design relevant programmes and operationalizing those programmes. Lack of resources constrains the effective attempts by the civil society and security agencies to sensitize the community against violent extremism to implement programmes on CVE. Attempts to fundraise from private sectors and other charities should also be explored as long as such financial support does not compromise the objectivity of the CVE programmes.

8.10 Respect and tolerance for different religions and ethnicities

A deliberate effort in understanding other faiths and cultures is paramount in bridging the avenues for misunderstanding and breaking stereotypes around certain faiths and
communities.\textsuperscript{53} For instance, an understanding that not all Muslims are or support violent extremism or that there is no particular community that is more prone to violent extremism than the other, will help in building a more resilient community against radicalization.

A comprehensive education curriculum through which young children are taken on different faiths and cultures will help build a more resilient populace as the issues are addressed early enough.\textsuperscript{54} This education should be extended to refugees and those in displaced camps. Empowered children are likely to be more resilient to radical ideologies.

5.11 Gender mainstreaming

The gender perspectives should be included in programmes on countering violent extremism in responding to emerging role of women in radicalization and violent extremism.

5.12 Supressing terrorists support activities

Terrorists engage in a number of trans-boundary resource mobilizations channels such as piracy, poaching, drug trafficking. Government should either legislate or implement existing legislations on these aspects.

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